Introduction
For a long time, the issue of trading indigenous cultural heritage (ICH) 1 was discussed with a defensive attitude. The question was generally how indigenous peoples could be protected against third parties misappropriating their knowledge assets in national or international trade. Academic writings adopting this approach seconded indigenous peoples fighting against old injustices stemming from unresolved problems of colonisation and a subjugation of their culture under Western law. Only very recently has a new wave of scholarship started to challenge this type of defensive thinking and tackle the issue of trading ICH from the development perspective. 2 The question now is how trade in ICH can contribute to the economic and social development of indigenous peoples. The idea behind this approach is that an active participation in the trade of traditional cultural expressions (TCEs) and other traditional knowledge (TK) would offer indigenous peoples not only a source of income -allowing for a reduction of government aid dependency -but also a means for becoming architects of their proper future and, thus, increasing their sense of identity and dignity. Because ICH is a multidimensional asset, an important precondition for such indigenous empowerment would certainly be that the decision about which TCE can be traded and which TCE -because of its sacred or otherwise important meaning for a community -must not enter the market is a prerogative of the respective TCE-and TK-owning indigenous community.
1 Whereas indigenous cultural and intellectual property (ICIP) is a term also used to describe the subject matter, indigenous peoples often prefer to speak of indigenous cultural heritage (ICH). Accordingly, the latter term is used in this chapter. 2 An important step in this development was the launch of the Swiss National Science Foundation funded 'International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage' research project in December 2009 at the University of Lucerne. This multi-year, international and trans-disciplinary project investigates how international law could be adjusted to allow indigenous peoples to actively participate in international trade with their cultural heritage without being constrained to renounce important traditional values. For more information see <http://www.unilu.ch/deu/research_projects_135765.html> Recent developments at the level of international law and policy-making support efforts to view trade in ICH from a development perspective to some extent. The agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) -as far as it deals with TK (including the relationship with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD))-and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are both sensitive to development considerations. 3 Neither organisation, however, is much concerned with indigenous issues in particular. 4 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has recently included the development dimension into its agenda, and the documents produced by its Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) since 2001 show that development is taken seriously. 5 However, the IGC has been reluctant to clarify whether interests of indigenous peoples should be treated in a privileged manner.
An important shortcoming of all current initiatives at the international level is that they increase rather than reduce the existing fragmentation of the relevant law on ICH. There is also a risk that these top-down initiatives will be difficult to implement, since indigenous and non-indigenous stakeholders may have diverging views even on central matters of regulation. This chapter endeavours to take up an idea that has little been studied so far: that is, exploring the potential of bottom-up approaches, including private initiatives of voluntary certification standards, as alternatives to top-down approaches in the field of ICH and development. An interesting question to be addressed is whether the very successful Fairtrade labelling system could be extended to trade in ICH in a way likely to be accepted by indigenous peoples. A further question will be how such voluntary certification standards would relate to WIPO's draft provisions on TK/TCEs, and whether they would be in conformity with WTO/ TRIPS law and policy-making.
3 Strengthening the contribution of culture to sustainable development has been a goal of UNESCO policy-making since the launch of World Decade for Cultural Development (1988 Development ( -1998 . For most recent developments see below n 10. 4 Although UNESCO stresses that its 'activities with indigenous peoples are framed by its missions to protect and promote cultural diversity, encourage intercultural dialogue and enhance linkages between culture and development', see <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=35393&URL_DO=DO_ TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>, its Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CCD) (UNESCO, 2005), does not respond sufficiently to the interests of indigenous peoples. This is because the CCD was designed by its drafters to protect national entertainment industries rather than creative expressions of indigenous peoples. Indeed, a reference to TCE and indigenous peoples was introduced only at a late stage of the negotiations. Although the adopted text does mention TCE and indigenous peoples a few times, the relevant provisions do not address the rights of the indigenous peoples themselves, but those of the states whose territory is affected. See C B Graber, 'Institutionalization of Creativity in Traditional Societies and in International Trade Law' in S Ghosh and R P Malloy (eds), Creativity, Law and Entrepreneurship (Edward Elgar, 2011) 234, 247-248. 5 See below n 13.
ICH International Policy-making and the Problem of Top-down Approaches
As most indigenous peoples appear in the lower end of socioeconomic statistics, the potential to generate an income from the trade of their cultural heritage -such as their designs, dances, songs, stories and sacred artwork -is not insignificant to their wellbeing. As recent research (including the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development) 6 shows, there is evidence 'that economic development in Indian Country has finally gained traction across many reservations only after policies of self-determination took effect'. 7 Similarly, we take the view that trade in indigenous knowledge assets may promote social and economic development of indigenous communities, 8 provided that such trade is controlled by them. 9 The requirement that indigenous communities decide beforehand whether a certain part of their cultural heritage may be traded must be a conditio sine qua non. The new scholarly approach to look at trade in ICH from a development perspective fits well with the growing international awareness of policy-makers that intellectual property (IP) and cultural expressions may be an important driver of social and economic development, including for indigenous peoples. As a follow-up to the 2010 UN Millennium Summit, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on culture and development on 20 December 2010. 10 The resolution emphasises the important contribution of culture for sustainable development, and for the achievement of national and international development objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals. chapter we take up Peter Drahos's suggestion to think also about alternative bottom-up approaches to commercialising ICH. 17 Since the prevention of fakes and reducing the market share of imitations would be crucial to enhance trade in ICH, international law could assist indigenous peoples through the establishment of a system of origin certification that would work at the international level.
Such a strategy may also find support from indigenous brokers, since the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues recommended, in a 2003 report, that states should promote 'the knowledge, application and dissemination of appropriate technologies and indigenous peoples' local products with certificates of origin to activate product activities, as well as the use, management and conservation of natural resources'. 18 A prominent forum for discussing issues of origin of traditional knowledge assets is the CBD. Although the CBD focuses on TK that is associated with genetic resources, discussions on disclosure or certification of origin held therein may be relevant also for other forms of TK relating to the subject matter of IP applications. A report delivered by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the invitation of the Seventh Conference of the Parties of the CBD 19 shows that certificates of origin are important in the realm of the CBD 'to certify that the source of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge has the authority to provide access on specified conditions, and also to certify the existence of ex ante benefit-sharing requirements that are compliant with the CBD and with relevant laws and equitable principles of the country providing such resources or knowledge'. 20 Beyond enabling access to TK associated with genetic resources and demonstrating prior informed consent and equitable benefit sharing (as a precondition for obtaining IP rights); 21 certificates of origin may facilitate further commercial uses. If certificates of origin are linked with labelling systems or origin marks, they may be useful 'in promoting commercial recognition of the subject matter of intellectual property and in obtaining benefits for countries 17 and indigenous or local communities that exercise rights over genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge'. 22 The report cautions, however, that this may raise difficult questions regarding the 'authenticity' standard to be applied.
In fact, experiences with the Australian Authenticity Labels, certifying as 'authentic' goods and services deriving from a work of art created by an indigenous person or people, were negative. What were the reasons for this failure? Fairtrade, another example of voluntary certification standards, is by contrast a big success. Why is this? Fairtrade certification and its system of minimum pricing were designed for commodity products. Could one nonetheless learn from this model to avoid flaws, such as those identified in the Australian Authenticity scheme, and develop a model that would meet the interests of both indigenous peoples and consumers in a global market? These questions will be addressed in the next section.
(b) Why Did the Australian Authenticity Label Fail?
Voluntary certification standards have been used in several countries as a means to promote trade in ICH. 24 These had had varying success. For example, whereas the Alaskan 'Silver Hand' certification mark has been around since 1961, 25 the New Zealand 'Māori Made'Toi Iho certification mark system was disinvested by the Government in 2009, as it had not achieved increased sales of Māori art by licensed artists or retailers. 26 Since the Australian Authenticity Label has been widely commented upon, we will have a closer look at this scheme and ask why it failed only two years after its introduction.
The Australian Authenticity Label was launched in 1999 along with a 'Label of Collaboration'. 27 The Label of Authenticity was for 'authentic' goods or services which were 'derived from a work of art created by an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person or people, [and] reproduced or produced and manufactured by Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people'. 28 The Label of Collaboration was for works that were a result of collaboration involving 'authentic' creation by an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, and reproduction or production and manufacture by non-indigenous persons, under a licence (for the copyright of the work) from a fair and legitimate agreement. 29 The purpose of the Australian Authenticity Labels was to maximise consumers' certainty 'that they were getting the genuine product', 30 to promote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander authorship, 31 and to help ensure a fair, equitable and improved return to indigenous authors. Both labels were registered as 'certification marks' under the Australian Trade Marks Act. 33 Whereas normal trade marks distinguish certain goods or services as those produced by a specific (natural or legal) person, certification marks indicate that the certified goods or services comply with a set of standards and have been certified by a certification authority. 34 The marks were owned by the National Indigenous Arts Advocacy Association (NIAAA). 35 The NIAAA was also the certification authority. In this function, the NIAAA certified that the protected goods or services complied with the required standard: that is, that they were or involved an 'authentic' creation by an Australian indigenous person.
36
The first step required for use of the marks was registration to the NIAAA. To register an artwork or similar product, an artist had to show that he or she identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander. Artists also had to show that they indeed were indigenous by descent through providing two signed forms certified by an Aboriginal corporation and passed at a meeting. 37 They also had to show that they were accepted as indigenous by a community, and had permission from the relevant community to make the artwork or product. 38 For the Collaboration Label, the indigenous artist and the producer or manufacturer had to apply jointly. 39 Once registered, the artist had permission to use the label on his or her artwork or product. 40 Use had to comply with a set of rules, including that the works were created within indigenous customary law. (2000) 9(2) Griffith Law Review 248, 252. 37 Janke, above n 27, 142. 38 Wiseman, above n 36, 261. Interestingly, many indigenous artists did not like having to prove their indigeneity and called it another 'Dog Tag' system. 39 Janke, above n 27, 143. Determining whether the contract between the indigenous artist and producer or manufacturer had 'fair trading terms' included assessing: (1) 'whether the Indigenous person who contributed to the work had the opportunity to obtain independent advice from NIAAA, an Arts Law Center or a legal adviser before signing the agreement'; and (2) 'whether the Indigenous person is required to assign their intellectual property rights in the work without additional payment of consideration'. 40 Arts Law Centre of Australia, above n 30, 1. 41 Janke, above n 27, 142.
On the retail level, the two marks allowed an indigenous arts and crafts retailer to inform customers that he or she supported the Authenticity Labels and that his or her business operated under a NIAAA licence. Practically, this licensing arrangement was exhibited by a sticker to be affixed on shop windows or doors. 42 The two Authenticity Labels existed only for two years. According to commentators, there were a number of reasons for this failure, including difficulties in defining 'authenticity' and insufficient funding of the system's administration. 43 Difficulties in defining and monitoring what fell into the term 'authentic' were certainly the main factors in the system's failure. 44 Definition involved value judgements about Aboriginal art and -as had been feared by members of the indigenous arts and crafts community -the distinction of two categories of authentic and non-authentic indigenous art. 45 The NIAAA was criticised for introducing an 'authenticity' standard in a top-down way, without sufficient involvement of indigenous stakeholders. 46 As a matter of fact, the NIAAA did not reflect that certain indigenous communities already had their own identification marks prior to the inception of the NIAAA marks. 47 Moreover, artists who were part of local or regional art centres or organisations did not feel that they needed the NIAAA labels to denote the 'authenticity' of their products.
48 Thus, the labelling system was never widely accepted or used by the indigenous peoples of Australia.
Commentators emphasised the impossibility of developing a common authenticity standard in an environment where there is little agreement among various indigenous groups regarding the concept of Aboriginal identity. In particular, rural and peripheral indigenous communities did not like the idea of a 'homogenising' national labelling system. 49 And many urban indigenous artists were concerned that 'authentic' would denote indigenous art 'that employs traditional techniques, materials and imagery'. 50 There were flaws not only in the definition of 'authenticity' but also in the implementation of the standard. According to commentators, the NIAAA's lack 42 Ibid 144. 43 L Wiseman, 'The Protection of Indigenous Art and Culture in Australia: The Labels of Authenticity' (2001) 23(1) European Intellectual Property Review 14; Rimmer, above n 27; Drahos, above n 16, 402; Janke, above n 27, 145. 44 Rimmer, above n 27, 157. 45 Wiseman, above n 43, 14. According to Matthew Rimmer, the labels served to 'typecast Indigenous artists in a narrow and rigid fashion'; Rimmer, above n 27, 158. 46 J Anderson, The Production of Indigenous Knowledge in Intellectual Property (PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2003) 240; Rimmer, above n 27, 158-159. 47 Anderson, above n 46, 240-241; Wiseman, above n 36, 266-267. 48 Janke, above n 27, 147. 49 Rimmer, above n 27, 160. 50 Anderson, above n 46, 240. Wiseman noted that '[f]or urban and non-traditional artists, the way authenticity is defined raises the problem that they may be stigmatized for not being "real" or "authentic" Aboriginal artists' Wiseman, above n 43, 20. See also Wiseman, above n 36, 262. of independence made it too easy to show indigeneity and to get the marks. 51 It seems obvious that independence cannot be assured in an organisational structure where -as in the case of the NIAAA -the owner of the mark also sets the standards and acts as the certification body.
Poor funding was considered to be a second main structural shortcoming of the Australian Authenticity scheme. Although the NIAAA received some funding from the Australia Council and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, these funds were not sufficient to establish the scheme at a national and international level. 52 To make the labels work effectively, the NIAAA would have required more money for marketing campaigns to raise awareness of the labels among consumers and tourists. 53 Commentators reckon that the lack of funding was also the reason all the responsibilities were given to the NIAAA rather than to a separate body established to undertake the certification role, as was recommended by Terri Janke prior to the launch of the labelling system.
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Besides these structural flaws, there were also shortcomings in the implementation and administration of the Australian scheme through the NIAAA. As a result of allegations of misappropriated funds and failures of accountability, the federal government's funding to the NIAAA was discontinued. 55 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Arts Board of the Australia Council commissioned a review of the NIAAA in 2002. 56 The review concluded that the NIAAA had poor governance and management, tended to focus on Sydney 57 and under-represented other indigenous communities, set a problematic definition of 'authenticity', had problems implementing the system and failed to be financially accountable. The review also placed some blame on the funding agencies for not supervising the NIAAA and for creating a culture of non-accountability. 52 Drahos, above n 16, 403. The scheme was meant to be additionally financed through charging fees for applications and labels. However, the A$30 registration for the Label of Authenticity and A$50 for the Collaboration Label were considered to be prohibitive by many Aboriginal artists. This was because much of the artist community was made up of hobby artists whose income was insufficient to warrant the registration fee. See Wiseman, above n 36, 265; Janke, above n 27, 145. 53 Janke, above n 27, 146. 54 T Janke, In comparison with the failure of the Australian Authenticity mark, the success of the Fairtrade label is striking. The history of the Fairtrade system goes back to 1988, when Max Havelaar was founded as the first Fairtrade label under the initiative of the Dutch development agency Solidaridad. 59 In the late 1980s to early 1990s, this initiative was replicated in several other markets in Europe and North America, each with its own mark. 60 To unite all the existing labelling initiatives under one umbrella, and harmonise standards and certification worldwide, in 1997 the Fairtrade Labelling Organization International (FLO) was established in Bonn, Germany. 61 The different labels remained until 2002, when the FLO launched the international FAIRTRADE Certification Mark and the former labels were gradually replaced. 62 Canada and the US still use their own labels. 63 An overall concern of the fair trade movement is to fight for global justice and to equalise the north-south divide of producers in the world market for commodity products.
64 Accordingly, the purpose of the Fairtrade labelling system is to help small-scale farmers and workers in developing countries.
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In addition to ensuring that suppliers are not unfairly exploited by the mechanisms of the global market, the Fairtrade system aims at contributing to social and environmental development in marginalised regions of the world.
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From its beginning, a characteristic of the Fairtrade scheme was its grassroots collaborative approach. 67 Producers jointly own and manage the FLO, and producers are members on the Board of Directors.
68 Accordingly, producers determine the direction that Fairtrade will head towards, and decisions are taken in an open and inclusive fashion. 69 In our view, the bottom-up, collaborative and open approach of the Fairtrade system makes an important contrast to the NIAAA and the Australian Authenticity Labels. As we have highlighted above, the NIAAA operated in a top-down manner, many indigenous communities were never consulted about the development of the marks, and most artists never felt that the mark was theirs.
Stakeholder involvement is an important element of Fairtrade standards. Whereas the Australian scheme was based on a NIAAA-imposed standard of 'authenticity', Fairtrade standards are set in accordance with the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards. 70 According to ISEAL requirements, Fairtrade standard-setting processes are open, and involve the major stakeholders in the system, including producers and the FLO. 71 There are two sets of Fairtrade standards, for two different types of disadvantaged producers.
72 One applies to smallholders who are working together in cooperatives or other organisations with a democratic and participative structure. For these, a generic producer standard is that profits should be equally distributed among the producers. Furthermore, all members need to have a voice and vote in the organisation's decision-making process. 73 The other set of standards applies to workers, whose employers pay decent wages, guarantee the right to join trade unions (freedom of association), ensure health and safety standards, and provide adequate housing where relevant. Fairtrade standards also cover terms of trade. 74 Most products have a Fairtrade price, meaning that companies trading Fairtrade products must pay a minimum amount to the producers (to cover the costs of sustainable production). 75 This price is periodically reviewed by the FLO. 76 Producers also get an additional Fairtrade premium, which goes into a communal fund for workers and famers to invest in their communities: for example, for education or healthcare. The decision on how to do this is made democratically: for example, within a farmers' organisation or by workers on a plantation. 77 The standards also allow producers to request partial pre-payment of the contract. 78 This is important for small-scale farmers' organisations to ensure they have cash flow to pay farmers. Buyers are required to enter into trading relationships so that producers can predict their income and plan for the future.
A second major difference between Fairtrade and the Australian scheme relates to the certification process. Whereas in the Australian scheme all functions were centralised in the NIAAA, in the Fairtrade system the process for certification is separate from the system's operational management and performed by FLO-CERT. 79 FLO-CERT is ISO 65 certified. ISO 65 is the leading, internationally recognised quality norm for bodies operating a product certification system. 80 ISO 65 certification guarantees: (1) the existence of a quality management system; (2) transparency in all processes; and (3) independence in the certification decisionmaking. To ensure compliance with ISO 65 rules, FLO-CERT is checked by an independent third party. As part of the certification process, FLO-CERT inspects and certifies producer organisations, and audits traders to check whether they comply with the standards. 81 The cost of audits -which also include on-site inspections of producers -is charged to the producer wanting to become part of the system. One important reason for the impressive dissemination of Fairtrade among marginalised producers is the financial and administrative assistance offered by FLO for initial applicants.
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The marketing aspect is a third major difference between Fairtrade and the Australian scheme. Whereas poor national and international marketing was one of the reasons for the failure of the Australian Authenticity marks, the Fairtrade system's marketing concept is considered crucial for the success of the Fairtrade movement. 83 The goodwill of Fairtrade is represented internationally by the FAIRTRADE Certification Mark, which is an internationally registered trade mark. The mark is a product label, mainly intended for use on the packaging of products that satisfy the Fairtrade standards. 84 It allows consumers to buy products in line with their value judgements regarding justice in the northsouth divide. 85 represents is assured by the high quality of the standardisation and certification processes, and the continued checking of compliance. The mark is now the most widely recognised social and development label in the world.
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The FAIRTRADE mark is owned by FLO, but Fairtrade products are marketed by national labelling initiatives or marketing organisations working in twentyfive countries. 87 The national labelling initiatives may also license out the mark in their countries. The FLO is striving to streamline marketing operations of the national marketing initiatives while taking account of the cultural diversity of all its members and stakeholders. 88 Finally, the Fairtrade label system is financially sustainable. 89 Comparatively, one of the reasons why the Australian system was deemed a failure was the lack of financial accountability.
(d) Preliminary Conclusion
Fairtrade aims to help farmers in developing countries exclusively. The system, moreover, is designed for commodity products.
91 Accordingly, it would not be possible to extend the current system to creative artefacts produced by indigenous peoples in developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada. First, such artefacts include tangible and intangible creations that in many ways are different from commodity products; and, secondly, indigenous peoples in these countries would be excluded from the system because of the development criterion.
Nonetheless, there are lessons that can be learned from the Fairtrade system. One important factor is certainly that Fairtrade did not begin from government or other top-down initiatives, but rather from the people in a grassroots manner. A second aspect is the institutional separation of the certification process from the other two functions of the system. Thirdly, in an environment of globalised markets, including markets for tangible and intangible artefacts of indigenous peoples, marketing strategies for an indigenous origin label must be developed at an international level. Finally, the success of such schemes depends largely on sufficient funding for proper marketing and consumer education. In the context of such a system for indigenous peoples, this may mean that strong state support may be required, at least initially.
Compatibility with International Law
In this section we will investigate how a voluntary standard certifying indigenous origin would relate to the in-progress WIPO legal instruments on TK/TCEs, and whether it would be in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement law and policy-making. 94 At the same time it was decided to start formal negotiations based on the draft proposals contained in the document on 'Revised Objectives and Principles' for TCE: that is, the 2005 draft provisions that had originally been prepared by the Secretariat. 95 In October 2011, the mandate was again renewed for the 2012-2013 biennium. In its 17th session, the IGC decided to use the results of the Intersessional Working Group on TCE (IWG 1) as the new textual basis for further negotiations. 97 The IGC also established open-ended drafting groups to streamline the articles on TCEs and to identify any outstanding policy issues. The work of these groups resulted in the document 'The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: Draft Articles', 98 which was discussed in the IGC's 18th session, the outcome of which was deliberated over in the 19th session in July 2011. 99 Since the start of the text-based negotiations in the 16th session of the IGC, drafting proposals made by member states have been continuously inserted into the working document, and updated versions have been produced after every session. 100 The lack of certainty about the general acceptance of these suggested changes makes a substantive analysis of the draft treaty difficult. Furthermore, no decision has yet been taken on whether these negotiations should lead to a binding or non-binding instrument and, even if binding and adopted by the WIPO General Assembly, states can still decide on whether they wish to be signatories or not. Thus, the following discourse is made tentatively.
The current document on TCE provides text that is relevant for certification trade marks. Article 3 of the draft provisions generally distinguishes the scope of and conditions for protection with regard to 'secret' TCEs and 'other' TCEs. Secret TCEs are protected against disclosure and any kind of use. With regard to other TCEs, there are three options. All three alternatives require that indigenous peoples be acknowledged as the source of the TCE, unless this is not possible because of the manner of use of the product. Under Alternative 1, it would be required that, with respect to TCEs which are words, signs, names and symbols, there be a collective right to authorise or prohibit the 'offering for sale or sale of articles that are falsely represented' as TCEs of the beneficiaries, and any use that 'falsely suggests a connection with the beneficiaries'. 101 There is also 97 The IWG is an IGC-established expert group, within which every WIPO member state is represented by one person. It was decided by the IGC that three IWG meetings would take place. IWG 1 on TCE took place in July 2010, and IWG 2 and 3 on TK and Genetic Resources, respectively, took place in February and March 2011. Although IWG is primarily an expert group, it can also draft text proposals for the amendment of the existing draft proposals for revised objectives and principles. a provision which allows indigenous peoples to object to any 'false, confusing or misleading indications' on goods or services that suggest an endorsement by or linkage with them. 102 Alternative 2 is the weakest option and does not mention protection from false misrepresentation. Finally, Alternative 3 states that adequate measures need to protect against the use of 'non-authentic' TCEs in trade 'that suggests a connection that does not exist'.
The working document that was the basis for the negotiations until the 17 th session of the IGC provided requirements to prevent misleading indications and false endorsement by, or linkage with, a traditional community that were very similar to Alternative 1 and consistent with Alternative 3 outlined above. In the IGC Secretariat's commentary on Article 3 of the earlier draft, it mentioned a 'handicraft sold as "authentic" or "Indian" when it is not' as a practical example to illustrate the possible implementation of the provisions protecting against 'false or misleading indications in trade'. 103 According to the comment, the suggested principle could be put into practice at the national level through a number of measures, including 'the registration and use of certification trademarks'. 104 Although these comments are not part of the current working document, which is free of comments, they show that a system of voluntary certification for standards on ICH would, in principle, be in conformity with the current IGC draft provisions on TCE.
(b) WTO Law: TRIPS, GATT, GATS, Subsidies and the TBT Agreement
Together with the prohibition of discrimination, the elimination of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers to market access of goods and services is a key instrument of trade liberalisation provided by the law of the WTO. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement specifically deals with the implications of IP systems on the conditions of competition in international trade. provisions of the Paris Convention. 106 Article 15.1 TRIPS Agreement provides for a very broad definition of trade marks which covers all types of signs, so long as they are distinctive. 107 Although certification marks are not specifically mentioned, the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent this type of protection, since Article 1.1 explicitly authorises WTO members to 'implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement'. Article 16.1 gives an exclusive right to a trade mark owner for the use of the trade mark 'in the course of trade'. Non-commercial use is not protected. However, this is not a problem when the proposed certification system is intended for traded goods and services. Article 16.2 TRIPS Agreement provides protection of wellknown trade marks that goes beyond the Paris Convention. Whereas the Paris Convention limits the protection of well-known trade marks to trade marks used in respect of identical or similar goods, Article 16.2 TRIPS Agreement extends this protection mutatis mutandis to services, and Article 16.3 extends the protection of well-known marks to non-identical and non-similar goods and services.
108 These provisions may be relevant if one would consider extending the FAIRTRADE label, which is certainly a famous mark, to services. Finally, Article 18 TRIPS Agreement provides that the registration of a trade mark shall be renewable indefinitely. with the principles of non-discrimination, market access and transparency. There exists significant support for the view that a government-led voluntary labelling system would nevertheless be consistent with both the Most-FavouredNation Treatment (MFN) 110 and National Treatment 111 obligations. There are also strong arguments that compliance with social standards, such as 'authenticity', could alone be sufficient to make products non-'like' and, thus, allowably differentiated.
(iii) Subsidies
Government support for a labelling system could be considered a subsidy. The law of the WTO provides rules on subsidies for goods but not for services. as: (1) a financial contribution by a public body; (2) that confers a benefit; (3) to a specific enterprise or industry. The concept of 'financial contribution' is not limited to a direct transfer of funds, but includes reduction of costs, tax breaks 114 or other fiscal incentives to an industry. 115 On the other hand, the requirement of a 'financial contribution' means that not all government measures that confer a benefit are subsidies. 116 Even if state funded, a support scheme, such as the Australian Authenticity Label, would not constitute a 'subsidy', as it would not be a financial contribution, as required by Article 1.1 SCM Agreement, or take the form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI GATT. The funding of a trade mark would neither reduce the costs of producers (for example, in production or in the export process) nor directly affect production. It would be neither contingent on export performance nor trade distorting (directly artificially increasing exports), and would not affect comparative advantage. 117 Moreover, Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement states that the provision of governmental services is not to be considered as conferring a benefit, if the service is provided for adequate remuneration. Thus, a financially self-sustaining certification system (such as the Fairtrade system, through membership fees and other income) 118 would be compliant with the SCM Agreement. Even if fulfilling the other requirements of a 'subsidy', the funding of a trade mark for authentic indigenous cultural products would be considered general and not specific, as it would apply to more than one enterprise, industry or region, 119 and would not be dependent thereon.
(iv) TBT Agreement
With regard to technical regulations and standards for the trade in goods, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) must be respected to ensure that they do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 120 The TBT Agreement covers packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and procedures for assessing conformity with the technical regulations and standards. 121 Since 'regulations' are mandatory for the purposes of the Agreement, a voluntary labelling system would be a 'standard' rather than a 'regulation'. Under the TBT Agreement, the requirements for voluntary systems are less stringent than those for mandatory systems.
122 'Standard' is defined as: Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
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Although 'recognized body' is not defined in the TBT Agreement, it is not limited to governments or public authorities, but may also include non-governmental standardising bodies. 124 A 'non-governmental body' is a body other than a central government or local government body, 125 and includes 'a non-governmental body which has legal power to enforce a technical regulation'. 126 Private organisations managing the proposed label would fall into this definition.
It is evident that the TBT Agreement applies to processes and production methods (PPMs). However, there remain several open questions with regard to whether an authenticity standard for product differentiation would be covered by the TBT Agreement. To begin with, it is not clear whether such a standard would be product related. 127 Assuming that such a standard is non-product related (NPR), means in the TBT context. 134 In any case, these are only 'best effort' or 'secondlevel' obligations of members. 135 Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the proposed system would be contrary to the Code. 136 In conclusion, whereas the TRIPS Agreement provides for positive protection for certification trade marks, there is no evidence suggesting that voluntary certification standards -even if government supported -would not be consistent with the GATT, the GATS, or the TBT and the SCM Agreements.
Conclusion
The burgeoning market for indigenous goods and services has resulted in a parallel increase in the production of non-authentic products of this nature. In recognition of this, many label schemes have been initiated in an attempt to validate authenticity, and educate and sway consumers away from nonauthentic products. However, none of these has achieved success comparable with the Fairtrade label. Indeed the Australian certification label system was shut down after only two years of operations, and the New Zealand Māori-made (toi iho) system was disinvested by the government in late 2009.
The four main structural reasons for the failure of the Australian system were: (1) the 'top-down' nature of the system and the poor consultation with the relevant stakeholders prior to its inception; (2) difficulties in defining the standard of 'authenticity' and then controlling what fell into this; (3) non-independence of the certifier, which was the same body that set the standards and owned the trade marks; and (4) poor funding of the system, which meant an inability to market the initiative adequately in Australia, let alone internationally. Conversely, the FLO Fairtrade scheme started as a 'bottom-up' initiative and continues to integrate stakeholder involvement into every aspect of its decisionmaking processes, including the setting of standards. Moreover, certification is not performed by the FLO, but by FLO-CERT. Though owned by FLO, FLO-134 Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al, above n 127, 207. The term 'reasonable measures' was derived from Article XXIV:12 GATT, which requires that a member 'shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territories.' It is limited in scope to situations where the central government body is in the position to direct or influence compliance, e.g. if there are legal means available for this. Political resistance or sensitivity would not be sufficient to deter the obligation, but requiring a change in law (particularly constitutional law) would likely not be reasonable. Standards should not restrict trade unnecessarily and should be published 60 days before adoption to allow interested parties to submit comments. These are outlined and discussed in Koebele and LaFortune, above n 132, 247-253. and involve varying production processes and costs. 144 Consequently, it could be argued that the Fairtrade system is more suited for TK-rather than TCErelated products. However, given the large variety of agricultural goods among indigenous communities, the creation of standards could prove complicated even for these goods. Moreover, considering the difficulties in getting different Australian Aborigines to identify with an Australian labelling system, it may be equally (if not more) problematic to convince many different indigenous peoples from around the world to stand behind a pan-global label which is to some extent meant to reflect identity. 145 The vast differences between indigenous communities would make the creation of the standards logistically difficult. Finally, it is worth noting that the democratic structure required under the FLO general standards could contradict the customs of certain indigenous communities.
Although the idea of employing the FLO scheme for indigenous purposes is tempting, a great deal of research would be needed to make this work. An avenue to explore could be the formulation of only one set of FLO standards for all indigenous products or services, aside from those otherwise certified by the FLO. These standards would have to be quite broad and general, and capable of covering a wide range of products or services. A difficult question to resolve would be what exactly it is they should address. Moreover, we suggest studying the possibilities of interfacing 'Fairtrade philosophy' with existing marketing structures successfully operated by indigenous people at the local level, such as the Aboriginal cultural centres that exist in Australia. These centres could be of help in the most difficult task of developing a standard of ' Aboriginal origin' or ' Aboriginal authenticity' that would be accepted by indigenous people (locally) while, at the same time, complying with broader FLO standards (globally).
